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TEACHERS AND OTHER PUBLIC SECTOR
EMPLOYEES: HOW CAN WE MORE EFFECTIVELY
RESPOND TO THE CONCERTED ACTIVITY
QUESTIONS?
I. INTRODUCTION
"The King can do no wrong." This sentiment lies at the heart
of the law of sovereignty.' For many years this phrase governed the
relationship between public employees and their government em-
ployers. Consequently, labor relations in the public sector have
evolved differently than in the private sector. Due, process,2 property
rights' and prohibitions on the right to strike are features of public
employment which can be contrasted with the private sector.
In recent years public sector labor relations have become more
closely aligned with private sector principles.4 In California, crucial
public sector collective bargaining principles were called into ques-
tion in 1985 with the case of County Sanitation District No. 2 v.
Los Angeles County Employees' Association. In County Sanitation,
the California Supreme Court held for the first time that a right to
strike exists for public sector employees under the Meyers-Millias-
Brown Act.6 However, allowable public employer responses to
strikes were not addressed.
The purpose of this Comment is to address the scope of the
County Sanitation decision and to examine the responses available to
the public employer. Although this Comment focuses on public
school employment, many of the principles discussed apply generally
to other public sector employment as well.
© 1989 by Donna Williamson
1. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees' Ass'n., 38 Cal. 3d
564, 575, 699 P.2d 835, 846, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 431 (1985).
2. See infra section V(b)(1).
3. See infra section V(b)(1).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982). The private sector consists of those businesses which are
affecting commerce and not expressly excluded by statute. Id.
5. 38 Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985).
6. Id. at 592, 669 P.2d at 854, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 443, ("[l]t is not unlawful for public
employees to engage in a concerted work stoppage for the purpose of improving their wages or
conditions of employment, unless it has been determined that the work stoppage poses an
imminent threat to public health or safety." Id.).
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Section II addresses the laws governing private sector employ-
ment. Analogies between the private and public sectors are presented
to help illustrate the development of public sector labor relations.
Section III discusses public sector employment and examines the de-
velopment of statutes governing public school employees. Section IV
examines the right to strike in private and public sector employment.
Although the focus of this Comment is public employer responses to
employee strikes, it is necessary to address the right to strike in order
to fully examine the issue of public employer responses. Sections V
and VI focus on public employer responses to public employee
strikes. Existing impediments and potential employer responses are
also examined. Section VII proposes that the Legislature provide for
the right to strike and develop a scheme of reasonable public em-
ployer responses to strikes.
II. PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
The collective bargaining relationship between private sector
employees and employers is governed by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA).7 The NLRA is composed of four major bodies of
federal legislation: the Norris-La Guardia Act, 8 the Wagner Act,9
the Taft-Hartley Act,'0 and the Landrum-Griffin Act."
The Norris-La Guardia Act,' 2 passed in 1932, removed the
power of the courts to issue restraining orders or injunctions in labor
disputes.' This Act protected employees participating singly or in
concert in certain organized labor activities.'
The Wagner Act of 1935 guaranteed employees the freedom to
join or assist labor organizations; the freedom to bargain collectively
with their employer; and the right to engage in concerted activities.'
The Taft-Hartley or Labor Management Relations Act
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982).
8. Norris-La Guardia Act, id. §§ 101-115 (1982).
9. Wagner Act, id. §§ 151-169.
10. Taft-Hartley Act, id. §§ 141-197.
11. Landrum-Griffin Act, id. §§ 401-531.
12. Id. §§ 101-115.
13. The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure
or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
Id. § 152(g).
14. Id. § 104.
15. Id. §§ 151-169.
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(LMRA) was passed in 1947.16 Its purpose was to restrict the power
of labor unions with respect to interrupting or influencing the flow
of commerce. The LMRA also established union unfair labor prac-
tices, as well as procedures for dealing with labor-management strife
during national emergencies.
Finally, the Landrum-Griffin Act, known as the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act, was passed in 1959 in re-
sponse to the corruption and lack of democratic procedures within
unions. It established reporting regulations for internal union activi-
ties and a "Bill of Rights" for members of labor organizations.1 7
Collectively these four statutes (together referred to as the
NLRA) govern the labor relations of all businesses engaged in or
affecting commerce 8 within the United States. The NLRA is inter-
preted broadly and preempts state labor laws wherever the two over-
lap.1" Its provisions set forth the rights of employees and employers
with respect to labor relations, and defines unfair labor practices.
The NLRA is administered by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). 20 Activities commonly performed by the Board include in-
vestigating and litigating unfair labor practices, certifying bargaining
units, and conducting elections. 21
III. PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
A public sector employee is one who is employed by "the
United States or any wholly owned government corporation and any
state or political subdivision thereof."'2 2 The NLRA does not address
collective bargaining in the public sector.2" Specific federal and state
statutes govern the employment relationship of public employees.
16. Id. §§ 141-197.
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
18. Id. § 152(7).
19. Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
20. The National Labor Relations Board was created by the National Labor Relations
Act as a board concerned with the administration of labor relations, and for purposes of avoid-
ing, through adjustment, serious labor disputes which, if permitted to reach the strike stage,
would necessarily hurt employers, employees, and the public. It is a statutory public, adminis-
trative, agency having a constitutional function, and acting in the public interest. Although not
a court, it is generally regarded as quasi-judicial in character, possessing judicial as well as
administrative functions. 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 501 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-168 (1973).
22. 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 33 (1967).
23. "The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, di-
rectly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government
corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof." 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
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Consequently, the legal nature of public employment may vary from
state to state, in contrast with private employment which is uni-
formly governed by the NLRA. Public sector collective bargaining
statutes tend to be largely modeled after the NLRA.24 However, ma-
terial differences between the two can and do exist."' A review of the
history of public sector educational employment within the State of
California will demonstrate the differences between public and pri-
vate sector employment.
During the past twenty-five years, California public school em-
ployees have been subject to vast changes in the laws governing their
employment relationship. Those changes were brought about by a
series of statutes, including the Brown Act,2 the Winton Act2 7 and
the Rodda Act (EERA),2 s which were designed to establish an effec-
tive approach to public sector labor relations by recognizing the
unique elements inherent in the public sector.
A. The Brown Act
The Brown Act29 played a significant role in the development of
public sector labor relations. It was the first legislation to set forth
collective bargaining rights for publit employees. Previously, public
24. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3502 (West 1980) ("Except as otherwise provided by
the Legislature, public employees shall have the right to form, join, and participate in the
activities of employee organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on
all matters of employer - employee relations. Public employees also shall have the right to
refuse to join or participate in the activities of employee organizations. ... ) and 29 U.S.C. §
157 (1982) ("Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing . . . for the
purpose of collective bargaining . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
such activities .. ").
25. A major difference lies in the right to strike: with respect to the right to strike, the
state legislature has the power to provide in what manner public employees may enforce their
right to collectively bargain. City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 243 N.E.2d 128,
295 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1968). A statute prohibiting strikes by public employees has been held
valid. Di Maggio v. Brown, 19 N.Y.2d 283, 225 N.E.2d 871. 279 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1967).
26. The Brown Act, ch. 1964, 1961 CAL. STAT. 4141, amended by ch. 1390, 1968 CAL.
STAT. 2725 (codified as amended in CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3510) (West 1980 & Supp.
1989)). The Brown Act codified the concept of public employee bargaining. It required all
public employers to meet and confer with employees. Final decision-making existed with man-
agement. This Act is now known as the Meyers-Millias-Brown Act.
27. The Winton Act, ch. 2041, 1965 CAL. STAT. 4660 (codified in CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 13080-13088) (West 1975)) (repealed 1975).
28. The Rodda Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540 et seq. (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). The
Rodda Act, also known as the Educational Employee Relations Act (hereinafter EERA), es-
tablished collective bargaining within the educational sector of public employment. It is the
statute which currently governs educational employees in California.
29. See supra note 26.
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employees had no right to bargain collectively and the employer
could unilaterally determine working conditions. Most significantly
this Act established the "meet and confer" 80 requirement which com-
pelled employers to meet with employees and consider their employ-
ment concerns."1 The employer, however, still retained the ultimate
decision-making power over employee working conditions. The
Brown Act only applied to public school employees for a short time.
In 1965, the labor relations of public school employees became
specifically governed by the Winton Act. 2
B. The Winton Act
Patterned after the Brown Act, the purpose of the Winton Act
was to strengthen existing procedures by establishing uniform and
orderly methods of communication between public school employees
and their employers."3 Although similar in principle to the Brown
Act, the Winton Act also provided dispute resolution mechanisms,
such as fact-finding 4 and non-binding recommendations by a third
30. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West 1980). "Meet and confer" means the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the exclusive representative of its employees to
meet at reasonable times and to confer in good faith with respect to matters within the scope of
representation. The process should include adequate time for the resolution of impasses. If
agreement is reached between representatives of the employer and the exclusive representative,
they shall jointly prepare a written memorandum of such understanding which shall be
presented to the employer for concurrence. However, these obligations do not compel either
party to agree to any proposal or require the making of a concession. Id.
31. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3500 (West 1961).
It is the purpose of this chapter to promote the improvement of personnel man-
agement and employer-employee relations within the various public agencies in
the State of California by providing a uniform basis of recognizing the right of
public employees to join organizations of their own choice and be represented by
such organizations in their employment relationships with public agencies.
Id.
32. The Winton Act, ch. 2041, 1965 CAL. STAT. 4660 (codified in CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 13080-13088 (West 1975)) (repealed 1975).
33. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13080 (West 1975) (repealed 1975).
34. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3548.2 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). Factfinders investigate
issues related to the dispute at hand and make recommendations.
In arriving at their findings and recommendations, the factfinders shall consider,
weigh, and be guided by all the following criteria:
(1) State and federal laws that are applicable to the employer.
(2) Stipulations of the parties.
(3) The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the public
school employer.
(4) Comparison of the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of the em-
ployees involved in the fact finding proceeding with the wages, hours, and con-
ditions of employment of other employees performing similar services and with
other employees generally in public school employment in comparable
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party."5 Additionally, the Act expanded the scope of the "meet and
confer" requirement to include not only employment related issues,
but also issues involving the professional interests of educators.3
Thus, the Winton Act clarified many aspects of public educa-
tion employment.87 However, it did not change the status of the right
to bargain collectively or the right to strike.38 Although the scope of
representation allowed under the Act 9 included elements tradition-
ally found within the private sector,40 agreements reached under the
Act were not binding. Attempts to interpret the Act as conferring
collective bargaining rights were met with resistance.4 The courts
communities.
(5) The consumer price index for goods and services, commonly known as the
cost of living.
(6) The overall compensation presently received by the employees, including
direct wage compensation, vacations, holidays, and other excused time, insur-
ance and pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits; the continuity and sta-
bility of employment; and all other benefits received.
(7) Any other facts, not confined to those specified in paragraphs (1) to (6),
inclusive, which are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in mak-
ing the findings and recommendations.
Id.
35. Id. § 3548.3. A nonbinding third party recommendation consists of the fact finding
panel making a recommendation to management and the bargaining unit after finishing the
fact finding process. However, the parties are not bound by the decision; it is advisory only. Id.
36. The Winton Act, ch. 2041, 1965 CAL. STAT. 4660 (codified in CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 13080-13088 (West 1975)) (repealed 1975); The Winton Act, ch. 1413, § 5, 1970 CAL.
STAT. 2683, 2686. See also Rodda, Public Employment Relations Symposium: Collective Bar-
gaining in the California Schools, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 845 (1978). Professional inter-
ests include educational objectives, the determination of the content of courses and curriculum,
and the selection of textbooks to the extent such matters are within the discretion of the public
school employer under the law. Id.
37. The Brown Act originally applied to all public sector employees. The Winton Act
separated public school employees and added provisions that were of paiticular interest to this
group. One of the most significant additions was the inclusion of professional interests in the
scope of representation. See supra note 36.
38. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). See also Grasko v. Los
Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 31 Cal. App. 3d 290, 107 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1973).
39. CAL GOV'T CODE § 3543.2(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). This section reads in
pertinent part:
The scope of representation shall be limited to matters relating to wages, hours
of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. "Terms and
conditions of employment" mean health and welfare benefits, . . . leave, trans-
fer and reassignment policies, safety conditions of employment, class size, proce-
dures to be used for the evaluation of employees, organizational security, . . .
procedures for processing grievances and the layoff of probationary certificated
school district employees.
Id.
40. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13084 (West 1980). Cf N.L.R.A. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-166
(1982).
41. See, e.g., Grasko, 31 Cal. App. 3d at 302, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 342; California Fed'n of
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focused on the differences between the Winton Act and the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' 2 and concluded that "it is firmly es-
tablished that the Winton Act does not authorize collective
bargaining."4
The wording of the Winton Act was unclear. Confusion regard-
ing which aspects of employment were subject to the "meet and con-
fer" requirement resulted in a variety of interpretations and imple-
mentations by school districts throughout California. In San Juan
Teachers Association v. San Juan Unified School District,"' the
court stated that the Legislature intended a sweeping definition of
the scope of the "meet and confer" requirement to compensate for
the employees' inability to bargain collectively or to strike.4 It was
this type of broad interpretation which led to inconsistent applica-
tions of the Winton Act.
The inconsistent applications of the Act motivated school ad-
ministrators, board members, employees and legislators to work to-
wards enacting a law which would be interpreted in a uniform man-
ner, and which would improve negotiations with public school
employees. 6 Thus, a series of bills was introduced beginning in
1970 and culminating in 1976 with the repeal of the Winton Act
and passage of the Educational Employee Relations Act (EERA), or
the Rodda Act. 47
Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary Schools, 272 Cal. App. 2d 514, 77 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1969);
Berkeley Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 254 Cal. App. 2d 660, 671, 62 Cal. Rptr. 515,
522 (1967).
42. Grasko, 31 Cal. App. at 301, 107 Cal. Rptr. 345.
Employer-employee relations in private industry are generally governed by the
National Labor Relations Act and section 923 of the [California] Labor Code,
which secures substantially similar rights for employees in intrastate business.
Public employees, however, have historically been on an entirely different foot-
ing, and separate and distinctive legislative treatment has been given to the reg-
ulation of their employment relations.
Id. (Citations omitted).
43. Id. at 302, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 342. See also California Fed'n. of Teachers v. Oxnard
Elementary Schools, 272 Cal. App. 2d 514, 77 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1969).
44. San Juan Teachers Ass'n v. San Juan Unified School Dist., 44 Cal. App. 3d 232,
118 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1974).
45. Id. at 249, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
46. See Rodda, supra note 36 (Senator Rodda discusses the various problems existing
under the then current statutes and traces his attempts to introduce legislation which would
clarify major features of labor relations within the educational sector.).
47. The Rodda Act, CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3540 et seq. (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). See
also supra note 28.
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C. The Rodda Act (EERA)
The EERA maintained the focus of previous labor relations
statutes but added formerly unrecognized aspects of collective bar-
gaining, such as the right of employees to join employee related or-
ganizations of their choice.48 Now in its thirteenth year, EERA has
afforded public school employees the most consistent statutory guid-
ance to date. Case law throughout this period, and the terms of the
Act itself, have helped to interpret the definition of both the scope of
representation"' and unfair labor practices5" under the Act. Amend-
ments to the statute have further defined such terms as "managerial
48. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
49. San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Rel. Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 850, 663
P.2d 523, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1983); Public Employment Rel. Bd. v. Modesto City Schools
Dist., 136 Cal. App. 3d 881, 186 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1982); Oakland Unified School Dist. v.
Public Employment Rel. Bd., 120 Cal. App. 3d 1007, 175 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1981). See also
supra note 39 (defining "scope of representation").
50. Link v. Antioch Unified School Dist., 142 Cal. App. 3d 765, 191 Cal. Rptr. 264
(1983); Council of School Nurses v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 113 Cal. App. 3d 666,
169 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1980). California Government Code section 3543.5 defines unfair labor
practices for public school employers:
It shall be unlawful for a public school employer to:
(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to discriminate or
threaten to discriminate against employees, or otherwise to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees because of their exercise of rights guaranteed by this
chapter.
(b) Deny to employee organizations rights guaranteed to them by this chapter.
(c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with an exclusive
representative.
(d) Dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any employee
organization, or contribute financial or other support to it, or in any way en-
courage employees to join any organization in preference to another.
(e) Refuse to participate in good faith in the impasse procedure set forth in
Article 9 (commencing with Section 3548).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.5 (West 1980).
California Government Code section 3543.6 defines unfair labor practices for employee
organizations:
It shall be unlawful for an employee organization to:
(a) Cause or attempt to cause a public school employer to violate Section
3543.5.
(b) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to discriminate or
threaten to discriminate against employees, or otherwise to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees because of their exercise of rights guaranteed by this
chapter.
(c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with a public school em-
ployer of any of the employees of which it is the exclusive representative.
(d) Refuse to participate in good faith in the impasse procedure set forth in
Article 9 (commencing with Section 3548).
Id. § 3543.6.
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employee"'" and "confidential employees." 52
1. The Public Employment Relations Board
The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB),53 was estab-
lished by EERA to administer the Act. This five person board oper-
ates in a manner similar to the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB).54 PERB investigates unfair labor practices, makes bar-
gaining unit determinations, and conducts hearings on public em-
ployment issues.5" Hearings are conducted pursuant to the rules and
regulations of the Office of Administrative Law." PERB has the
authority to bring an action in the appropriate court to enforce any
of its orders. 7 Parties may request judicial review before the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal after exhausting PERB procedures."
IV. THE RIGHT To STRIKE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT
Although the EERA established rights which are similar to
those granted under the NLRA, a significant difference exists be-
tween private and public sector employment with regard to the right
to strike.
A. The Private Sector
"A 'strike' is a concerted refusal by employees to do any work
for their employer, or refusal to work at their customary rate of
speed, until the object of the strike is attained, that is, until the em-
ployer grants the concession demanded."59 Strikes within the private
51. " 'Managerial Employee' means any employee having significant responsibilites for
formulating or administering agency or departmental policies and programs or administering
an agency or department." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3513(e) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
52. California Government Code section 3540.1(c) states: " 'Confidential employee'
means any employee who, in the regular course of his or her duties, has access to, or possesses
information relating to, his or her employer's employer-employee relations." CAL. GoV'T
CODE § 3540.1(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
53. See California Government Code section 3541 which explains in more detail the
rights, duties and scope of powers contained within PERB. Id. § 3541.3.
54. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
55. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3545, 3541.5 (West 1980).
56. Id. § 3541.3(g) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
57. Id. § 3541.30).
58. Id. § 3542.
59. 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 273 (1967). See also Lake Michigan College Fed'n of
Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community College, 390 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd.
on other grounds, 518 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1975).
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sector are protected by the NLRA so long as they are undertaken for
purposes and by methods not prohibited by the NLRA. 0 The right
to strike is granted by section 7 of the NLRA which states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment."'
Although strikes are not expressly addressed in this section of the
NLRA, the phrase "other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" is commonly
interpreted by the courts to include strikes.62 Utilization of this
phrase in other collective bargaining statutes, in both the private and
public sectors, has been held to represent an express grant of the
right to strike."3
B. The California Public Sector
Traditionally, California public sector employees were prohib-
ited from striking."' Such collective action by public employees was
viewed as a conspiracy against the government.66 This prohibition
against public sector strikes was known as the sovereignty concept.66
In City of Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated Association6 7
the court articulated the sovereignty concept by stating:
It is clear that in our system of government, the government is a
servant of all of the people. And a strike against the public, a
strike of public employees, has been denominated . . . as a re-
bellion against government. The right to strike, if accorded to
60. 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 273 (1967). See also NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,
373 U.S. 221 (1963).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1973).
62. See infra note 82.
63. Compton Unified School Dist. v. Compton Educ. Ass'n, PERB Order No. IR-50, at
41 (1987).
64. See infra text accompanying note 110.
65. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees' Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d
564, 569, 699 P.2d 835, 837, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 427 (1985).
66. Id. at 574-75, 699 P.2d at 841-42, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
67. City of Cleveland v. Div. 268 of Amalgamated Ass'n, 41 Ohio Op. 236, 90 N.E. 2d
711 (1949).
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public employees . . . is one means of destroying government.68
In a series of California cases69 the courts have echoed the
words of one court that "in the absence of legislative authorization
public employees in general do not have the right to strike .. "70
In 1985, the California Supreme Court addressed this issue in
County Sanitation District No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees'
Association.71 This case held that the right to strike exists under the
Meyers-Millias-Brown Act (MMBA), 72 which governs local govern-
ment employees. The right to strike under EERA was subsequently
addressed by PERB in Compton Unified School District v. Compton
Education Association .7  These cases arrived at contradictory con-
clusions despite the apparent similarities between the MMBA and
the EERA.74
1. The MMBA and the EERA
The Meyers-Millias-Brown Act governs the employment rela-
tionship of local government employees.75 It was implemented in
1968 to revise the Brown Act.7' The MMBA is in many respects
similar to the EERA. In fact, several sections of these statutes are
identical.7 Provisions governing collective bargaining are generally
the same,78 with the exception of dispute resolution. The MMBA
68. Id. at 239, 90 N.E. 2d at 715.
69. See, e.g., Stationary Eng'r Local 39 v. San Juan Suburban Water Dist., 90 Cal.
App. 3d 796, 801, 153 Cal. Rptr. 666, 669 (1979); City & County of San Francisco v.
Evankovich, 69 Cal. App. 3d 41, 47-48, 137 Cal. Rptr. 883, 886-87 (1977); City of San Diego
v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Local 127, 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 316-
17, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258, 264 (1970).
70. Los Angeles Metro. Transit Auth. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d
684, 687, 355 P.2d 905, 906, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1960).
71. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees' Ass'n., 38 Cal. 3d
564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985).
72. Id. See also supra note 26.
73. Compton Unified School Dist. v. Compton Educ. Ass'n., PERB Order No. IR-50
(1987).
74. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
75. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500 et seq. (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
76. Brown Act, ch. 1964, 1 Stat. 4141 (1961) (codified as amended in CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 3500 et seq. (1980 & Supp. 1989)); see also supra notes 26, 29-32 and accompanying
text.
77. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500 (West 1980) and CAL GOV'T CODE § 3540
(West 1980); compare CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3502 (West 1980) and CAL GOV'T CODE § 3543
(West 1980).
78. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3502 (West 1980) and CAL. GOv'T CODE § 3543
(West 1980).
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contains no clear mechanism for dispute resolution. 9 Parties at an
impasse may agree to appoint a mediator, but no statutorily man-
dated procedures exist. This is in direct contrast to the EERA which
contains extensive procedures for dispute resolution.8
County Sanitation and Compton addressed identical provisions
of the MMBA and the EERA. MMBA section 3509 and EERA
section 3549 state: "The enactment of this chapter shall not be con-
strued as making the provisions of section 923 of the [California]
Labor Code applicable to public employees."'" In the private sector,
section 923 is interpreted as granting employees the right to strike.8"
Controversy has centered around whether the omission of this lan-
guage represents legislative intent not to grant the right to strike ab-
sent statutory authorization.83
2. County Sanitation
In County Sanitation, the defendant union, Local 660, repre-
sented the blue collar employees of the Los Angeles Sanitation Dis-
trict. The plaintiff was a sanitation district within Los Angeles
County. Local 660 and the County Sanitation District had conducted
negotiations pursuant to the MMBA and had in past years reached
agreement. On July 5, 1976, a majority of the district's employees
went out on strike after negotiations between the district and the
union reached an impasse.84
The California Supreme Court examined the common law pro-
hibition against public employee strikes.8" These strikes were viewed
as a denial of governmental authority or sovereignty."' Additionally,
to allow such strikes was thought to afford excessive bargaining lev-
erage, distort the political process, improperly delegate legislative au-
thority and threaten the public welfare.8" The California Supreme
79. See County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employee's Ass'n, 38 Cal.
3d 564, 572 n.14, 699 P.2d 835, 840 n.14, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 429 n.14 (1985).
80. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
81. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3509 (West 1980); Id. § 3549 (West 1980).
82. A. Cox, D. Bok, & R. Gorman, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 503 (1986). "Con-
certed activities commonly consist of strikes, picketing, and boycotts." Id.
83. See Compton, PERB Order No. IR-50 at 74-75.
84. County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 567-568, 699 P.2d at 837, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
"Impasse" means that the parties have reached a point in meeting and conferring at which
their differences in position are such that further meetings would be futile. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 3540.1(f) (West 1980).
85. County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 573-74, 699 P.2d at 841, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 574, 699 P.2d at 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
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Court addressed each of these arguments individually and found the
common law prohibition to be without merit."'
The court also examined the omission of California Labor Code
section 923 from the MMBA.89 California Labor Code section 923
states in part:
Negotiation of terms and conditions of labor should result from
voluntary agreement between employer and employees . . . [Ilt
is necessary that the individual workman . . . be free from the
interference . . . of employers of labor . . . in the designation
of representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection."0
In the private sector, this language is interpreted as granting
employees the right to strike. The court held that the express omis-
sion of California Labor Code section 923 from the MMBA was not
intended as a prohibition against strikes. 1
The court examined two other California public employment
statutes. It found that one statute9" contained a provision identical to
the MMBA which also omitted Labor Code section 923, and addi-
tionally contained an express prohibition of the right to strike." The
other statute was the EERA. The court noted a case" in which it
was held that the identical section of the EERA"' did not specifically
prohibit strikes.9"
Although the holding of County Sanitation broadly established
the right to strike under the MMBA, the court imposed a limitation
on this right where essential services are interrupted or health and
safety considerations are relevant.9 Strikes affecting these areas are
prohibited by public policy.
88. Id. at 585, 699 P.2d at 856, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
89. California Government Code section 3509 (MMBA) states: "The enactment of this
chapter shall not be construed as making the provisions of Section 923 of the California Labor
Code applicable to public employees." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3509 (West 1980).
90. CAL. LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1971).
91. County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 573, 699 P.2d at 840, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
92. get this cite from author
93. County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 573, 699 P.2d at 840, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
94. San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 13, 593 P.2d 838, 846,
154 Cal. Rptr. 893, 901 (1979).
95. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3549 (West 1980).
96. County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 573, 699 P.2d at 840, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
97. Id. at 581, 699 P.2d at 846, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
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3. Compton
In Compton9 8 the defendant, Compton Education Association
("Association"), was the exclusive representative of the teachers of
the Compton Unified School District ("District"). The District and
the Association were engaged in collective bargaining negotiations
pursuant to the EERA. The parties were unable to reach agreement
during negotiations and subsequently reached an impasse. The par-
ties engaged in both mediation9 9 and fact-finding. The fact-finding
panel issued a recommended decision on October 28, 1986; however,
the Association did not agree with the recommendation. Between
November 1986 and February 1987, the District and the Association
engaged in post fact-finding negotiations. During this time the teach-
ers engaged in strike activities on several occasions which signifi-
cantly disrupted school operations.
In Compton, PERB held that strikes by public employees are
both unprotected and unlawful under EERA. 100 PERB described
three types of strikes in which public school employees might engage:
1) the pre-impasse' 0 ' economic strike; 02 2) the post-impasse eco-
nomic strike; 08 and 3) the unfair practice strike. 4 Of these three
types, only the unfair practice strike had previously been pro-
tected.' 0 5 Pre-impasse economic strikes had been held to constitute
unfair practices under EERA.'0 6 Post-impasse economic strikes, the
type in which the District was engaged, had not been ruled upon
prior to Compton. In reaching its conclusion that all types of strikes
under EERA are unlawful and unprotected, PERB solved the un-
certainty regarding post-impasse economic strikes and overruled its
98. Compton Unified School Dist. v. Compton Educ. Ass'n, PERB Order No. IR-50
(1987).
99. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543.2 (West 1980). "Mediation" means the efforts of a third
person, or persons, functioning as intermediaries, to assist the parties in reaching a voluntary
resolution to an impasse. Id.
100. While the County Sanitation court held that public employee strikes are lawful
under MMBA, PERB held no such right exists under EERA. Compton, PERB Order No.
IR-50 at 95.
101. See supra note 84.
102. An economic strike refers to a strike engaged in to achieve bargaining goals prior to
impasse or before the exhaustion of statutory procedures. See Id. §§ 3548-3548.5 (West 1980).
103. A post economic strike refers to a strike engaged in to achieve bargaining goals
after the exhaustion of the statutory impasse procedures. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3548-
3548.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
104. An unfair practice strike refers to a strike engaged purportedly in response to an
alleged unfair practice by the public school employer, which may occur pre-impasse, during
impasse, or post impasse. Compton, PERB Order No. IR-50 at 95.
105. Compton, PERB Order No. IR-50 at 95.
106. Compton, PERB Order No. IR-50 at 124.
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prior holding in Modesto City Schools District v. Modesto Teachers
Association' concerning unfair practice strikes. The Compton deci-
sion is significant because it narrows the alternatives available to dis-
satisfied public school employees." 8
The rationale set forth in Compton focused on the intent of the
Legislature and constitutional considerations. In the lead opinion,
PERB Member Porter examined the language of the EERA. He
determined that the omission of section 923 of the California Labor
Code '9 from the EERA clearly indicated a legislative intent not to
grant public school employees the right to strike."'
PERB also examined the selective granting or withholding of
the right to strike among various groups of public employees by the
Legislature."' The Board concluded that the Legislature's express
granting of the right to strike in twelve of the twenty-five public
employer-employee statutes indicated an intent not to allow the right
where the language did not expressly grant the privilege."'
In addition to examining the intent of the Legislature, Compton
addressed constitutional considerations. It stressed that "[iun analyz-
ing any legislative enactment affecting the operation of our public
schools, one must recognize and be ever mindful of the predominant
position of the public school system within California's constitutional
and statutory scheme, as well as its premier role in the public policy
of the state.""' PERB stressed that education is a fundamental in-
terest" 4 and focused on the constitutional and statutory right to have
public schools open."'
Finally, PERB examined the landmark case of County Sanita-
tion District No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees' Association," 6
which held that "the common law prohibition against public sector
strikes should no longer be recognized in California and, accordingly,
that public employee strikes are not tortious under California com-
107. Modesto City Schools Dist. v. Modesto Teachers Ass'n, PERB Decision No. 291
(1983).
108. Previously, under holding in Modesto City Schools, strikes were protected under
EERA in response to employer unfair labor practices. PERB Decision No. 291 (1983). The
Compton decision reverses Modesto City Schools thereby eliminating this option. See Compton,
PERB Order No. IR-50 at 160.
109. CAL. LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1971).
110. Compton, PERB Order No. IR-50 at 87.
111. Id. at 74-75.
112. Id. at 87.
113. Id. at 11.
114. Id. at 17.
115. Id.
116. 38 Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985).
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mon law.11 17 However, the lead opinion interpreted County Sanita-
tion narrowly. It focused on the exact language of the holding to find
limitations on the applicability of the decision to employees covered
under EERA. Member Porter characterized the County Sanitation
decision as one of a "divided and splintered Court," '118 thereby im-
plying that the holding is foundationally weak. 19
The dissent in Compton examined the language of EERA and
found no statutory prohibition against the right to strike. It high-
lighted the fact that the Meyers-Millias-Brown Act language con-
strued by the Supreme Court in County Sanitation is identical to the
language of EERA, 20 and stated "whether [PERB] likes it or not,
this issue has been definitively resolved." 21
4. The Present Status of the Right to Strike under EERA
The Compton decision is arguably challengable on grounds sim-
ilar to those set forth by PERB in its analysis of County Sanitation.
The Compton opinion literally construed the aspects of County Sani-
tation which focused on the common law prohibition against strikes.
PERB refused to apply the broader interpretation that this decision
granted public employees in California the right to strike.' The
portion of County Sanitation which construed the legislative silence
on the right to strike was also attacked. "It would appear that the
County Sanitation plurality proceeded on an invalid premise as to
the legislature's silence with respect to public employee strikes."12
It is questionable whether PERB's Compton opinion is control-
ling on the issue of whether public employees covered by EERA
have the right to-engage in strikes. The Compton decision is itself a
plurality opinion in which a dissenting member agreed with the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court's County Sanitation case. Member Craib, a
member of the plurality, stressed the holding of County Sanitation
and stated that public employee strikes are now legal in California
117. Id. at 585, 699 P.2d at 849, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 438 (1985).
118. Compton, PERB Order No. IR-50 at 106.
119. It should be noted that County Sanitation was decided by the Bird Supreme Court.
In light of the new makeup of the Court, it is questionable how County Sanitation would be
decided today.
120. See Compton, PERB IR-50 at 172.
121. Id.
122. County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 585, 699 P.2d at 849, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
123. Compton, PERB Order No. IR-50 at 115. A plurality opinion is "[a]n opinion of
an appellate court in which more justices join than in any concurring opinion (though not a
majority of the court) . . . as distinguished from a majority opinion in which a larger number
of the justices on the panel join than not." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1039 (5th ed. 1979).
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provided that there is no statutory prohibition or substantial and im-
minent threat to public health or safety. 12 4
In examining the nature of the Compton strike, Members Hesse
and Craib, both in the plurality, characterized the strike as intermit-
tent. Member Craib found this to be a solid basis for holding the
strike unprotected, but he carefully distinguished unprotected status
from illegal status. 25 Member Hesse refused to analyze the strike on
the basis of its intermittent nature and instead focused on the disrup-
tive nature of strikes in general.28 In doing so, however, Member
Hesse actually analyzed Compton in a manner consistent with the
County Sanitation decision. Her determination that the Compton
strike caused "a total breakdown of two discrete activities that are
guaranteed by statute and case law" 2 ' may fit within the "interrup-
tion of essential services" limitation imposed by the court in County
Sanitation.28
Member Hesse's concurrence with Member Porter's constitu-
tional arguments was supported by evidence which particularly ad-
dressed problems within the Compton Unified School District. Fac-
tors such as low academic achievement, dramatic absenteeism among
students and a loss of special programs for both teachers and educa-
tionally disadvantaged students are elements which, when weighed
against the extreme disruptiveness of this particular strike, may sup-
port a finding that the strike was unprotected. This conclusion is
consistent with the State Supreme Court's County Sanitation
decision.
Compton emphasizes that the issue regarding the right to strike
under EERA is neither clear nor settled. In light of the California
Supreme Court's opinion in County Sanitation, it is logical to as-
sume that the right to strike may exist or may be developing under
EERA in the future. This uncertain nature of strikes under EERA
causes the issue of employer responses to strikes to remain unclear.
Conversely, in the private sector, the right to strike is a settled issue
and employer responses have been tested both practically and legally.
124. See County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 580-81, 699 P.2d at 846, 214 Cal. Rptr. at
435.
125. Compton, PERB Order No. IR-50 at 176.
126. Id. at 162-64.
127. Compton, PERB Order No. IR-50 at 167. I-
128. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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V. EMPLOYER RESPONSES TO STRIKES
A. The Private Sector
A strike is not merely an exercise of protected rights by a union.
It also operates as an effective economic weapon against an em-
ployer. Although the employer may not openly retaliate against
strikers, action may be taken to protect the business. In the private
sector, two of the most common responses are locking out strikers
and hiring permanent replacements. A lockout occurs when an em-
ployer refuses to allow employees to work in an attempt to gain bar-
gaining concessions.1" 9 Hiring permanent replacements is also a le-
gitimate response to an economic strike 80 so long as it is done in a
non-discriminatory manner. " ' These two employer responses have
generally been considered correlative with the right of employees to
strike. " 2
Although the employer may not discharge employees for strik-
ing, hiring permanent replacements may result in an employee being
permanently removed from the position. The distinction between dis-
charging employees for striking and permanently replacing striking
employees was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the
landmark case of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. " 8 In
Mackay, several employees who engaged in an economic strike were
replaced by employees transferred from other divisions of the com-
pany. When the strike ended, employees who had been replaced at-
tempted to return to their jobs and were denied that right. "
The Court held that the strikers were still "employees" under
the NLRA."' However, the Court construed the Act to offer only
remedial protection against coercion and discrimination. The Court
clearly upheld the permanent replacement response and stated, "the
employer is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of
strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their employment,
in order to create places for them."' 36
In the years since Mackay was decided several cases have clari-
129. 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 273 (1980).
130. An economic strike must be contrasted with an unfair labor practice strike. The
employer options are limited when employer unfair labor practices are the reason for the
strike.
131. NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972).
132. 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 274 (1980).
133. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
134. Id. at 336-39.
135. Id. at 345.
136. Id. at 345-46.
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fled the boundaries of the permanent replacement response." 7 It is
clear that strikers retain their employment status and, consequently,
the remedial protections under the NLRA. Strikers cannot be dis-
criminated against and must be offered reinstatement when a posi-
tion for which the employee is qualified becomes available. Cases
throughout the years have defined discrimination and employees'
rights with respect to employer responses to strikes. Within the pa-
rameters of the NLRA and these cases, locking out strikers and hir-
ing permanent replacements remains a common employer response
within the private sector.
B. The Public Sector
In the public sector, employers' choices of response have been
varied. Employer responses have been reflective of the historically
illegal status of public employee strikes. The most common responses
include injunctive relief, termination of striking workers and tort
damages.' Although these options remain intact as viable responses
to illegal strikes, the California Supreme Court's County Sanitation
decision fails to address the issue concerning employer responses to
legal public sector strikes.
In California, public sector strike responses have not been ex-
plored with respect to legal public sector strikes. It is conceivable
that as they develop and expand they will be patterned, as are many
other aspects of public sector labor law, after the private sector.
However, significant differences between the status of private and
public sector employees must be reflected.
Three significant differences between the private and public sec-
tors determine the availability of strike responses. The first is the
existence of the property interest which public sector employees pos-
sess in their jobs. The second is the administrative burden associated
with public employees. The third is the unique nature of public
employment.
137. See NRLB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (employer guilty of unfair
labor practices by granting superseniority rights to strike replacements); NRLB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (employer guilty of unfair labor practices by granting vaca-
tion benefits to strikers who returned to work while denying those same benefits to employees
who remained on the picket line); NRLB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967)
(absent substantial business justification employer is obligated to offer reinstatement to striker
if and when a job for which employee is qualified becomes available).
138. See City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich, 69 Cal. App. 3d 41, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 883 (1977); Almond v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518
(1969); Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1050, 72 Cal.
App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977).
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1. Property Interests
Property rights and procedural due process safeguards are fea-
tures of public sector employment not found in the private sector.1 '
Property rights make it more difficult to terminate public sector em-
ployees. As a result, public sector workers have been afforded a level
of job security not generally found in private industry.
A person has a property interest in his position when there is a
legal right not to be removed from that position without due pro-
cess.1 40 Generally, in positions protected by property interests, per-
sons may be removed only for specifically enumerated reasons 41 af-
ter notice and a chance to respond.' 42 This principle was set forth in
the U.S. Supreme Court case of Board of Regents v. Roth,' 4  which
held that a property interest in continued employment is safeguarded
by due process.' 44 However, the case failed to define the method of
determining property interests, and failed to state what due process
is required to satisfy the protection. 4' This holding allowed individ-
ual states to define, within Roth's parameters, the elements necessary
for a property interest.
California adopted and expanded upon the Roth principles in
139. See Dichter, infra note 178.
140. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
141. California Education Code section 87732 states:
No regular employee shall be dismissed except for one or more of the following
causes:
(a) Immoral or unprofessional conduct.
(b) Any violation of Article 4 (commencing with Section 114000) of Chapter 3
of Title I of Part 4 of the Penal Code.
(c) Dishonesty.
(d) Incompetency.
(e) Evident unfitness for service.
(f) Physical or mental condition which makes him or her unfit to instruct or
associate with students.
(g) Persistent violation of or refusal to obey the school laws of the state or rea-
sonable regulations prescribed for the government of the community colleges by
the board of governors or by the governing board of the community college dis-
trict employing him or her.
(h) Conviction of a felony or of any crime involving moral turpitude.
(i) Conduct specified in section 1028 of the Government Code.
() Knowing membership by the employee in the Communist Party.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 87732 (West 1979).
142. Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 202-03, 539 P.2d 774, 780, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 20-21 (1975).
143. 408 U.S. 546 (1972).
144. Id. at 577.
145. Id.
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the case of Skelly v. State Personnel Board.4" In Skelly, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court found that under the California statutory scheme
public employees who achieve "permanent" 14 status have a property
interest in their job. 48
Due process must be afforded to an individual before job pro-
tection can be removed. In Skelly, the court held that due process
requires fulfilling certain procedural steps before disciplinary action
may be taken. Minimum safeguards include notice of the proposed
action and the reasons such actions are to be undertaken, and a rea-
sonable chance to respond. 4 The California Education Code identi-
fies similar procedures which must be followed prior to removal of a
permanent public school employee.150
The dismissal of public school employees for cause is governed
by several provisions of the California Educational Code. 5' These
sections address the grounds for dismissal of regular employees and
list the causes for which an employee may be terminated. They cod-
ify the property interest by removing the employer's option to termi-
nate at will.' 5
California Education Code sections 44932 and 87732 both ad-
dress grounds for dismissal of permanent employees. The language
of these two sections is virtually identical. Section 44932 states in
relevant part:
(a) No permanent employee shall be dismissed except for one or
more of the following causes:
(1) Immoral or unprofessional conduct.
(2) Commission, aiding, or advocating the commission of acts of
criminal syndicalism.
(3) Dishonesty.
(4) Incompetency.
(5) Evident unfitness for service.
(6) Physical or mental condition unfitting him to instruct or as-
146. Skelly, 15 Cal. 3d 194, 539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14.
147. A "permanent employee" is an employee who has satisfactorily completed a statu-
torily defined probationary period (three years) and has been retained as an employee beyond
that period. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.24 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
148. Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d at 206, 539 P.2d at 3, 124 Cal. Rptr. at
23.
149. Id.
150. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 87733-87741 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
151. Id. § 87732 et seq. and § 44932.
152. "Generally, a contract of employment for an indefinite term is a 'contract at will'
and may be terminated by either party." Joshua v. McBride, 716 S.W.2d 215, 217 (1986)
(citing Griffin v. Erickson, 277 Ark. 433, 436-37, 642 S.W.2d 308, 310 (1982)).
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sociate with children.
(7) Persistent violation of or refusal to obey the school
laws . ..
(8) Conviction of a felony or any crime involving moral
turpitude.
(9) Violation Section 51530 of this code ...
(10) Violation of any provision in Sections 7001 to 7007, inclu-
sive, of this code.
(11) Knowing membership by the employee in the Communist
Party."
Since "engaging in concerted activities" is not one of the "causes"
listed within these sections, or addressed elsewhere in the California
Education Code, it has been argued that management is barred
under the existing structure from replacing employees who strike.
However, it is arguable that these code sections don't apply to em-
ployees locked out or permanently replaced during a strike.
One significant aspect of public employment discharge statutes
is that they guarantee that the employee retains full employment sta-
tus unless and until that status is revoked by actions specified within
the statutes. Consequently, in order to remain outside the reach of
the discharge statutes, "permanently replacing" strikers must be dis-
tinguished from "discharging" strikers.
One distinguishing feature is the right to reinstatement. These
code sections address discharge of employees where there exists no
right to reinstatement. Cases since NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tele-
graph Co.154 have clearly held that a right to reinstatement exists
where striking employees have been permanently replaced. In NLRB
v. Laidlaw Corp.,'5" the Board stated that a right to reinstatement
exists "upon the departure of replacements unless they have in the
meantime acquired regular and substantially equivalent employ-
ment, or the employer can sustain his burden of proof that the fail-
ure to offer full reinstatement was for legitimate and substantial bus-
iness reasons." 15 This right to reinstatement places the employers'
action outside the statutorily mandated discharge procedures. As a
result, full employment status guaranteed until exhaustion of the
"just cause" discharge provisions does not apply. Thus, a standard
153. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44932 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
154. NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). See supra notes 133-
36.
155. NLRB v. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, affid, 414 F.2d 99, 105 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
156. Id. at 1369-70.
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somewhat lower than full protection. Providing remedial protection
against coercion and discrimination may arguably suffice.
2. The Administrative Burden
An additional feature of public sector employment not found in
the private sector lies in the administrative processes associated with
available responses. Due process requires notice and an opportunity
to respond. Generally, public employees are entitled to both pre-dis-
charge and post-discharge due process protections. It would clearly
be administratively impossible to provide the typical termination
process to every employee engaged in a widespread strike. Both the
staffing requirements and timing issues presented by such a process
would render it ineffective. Thus, in order to provide the public em-
ployer with a realistic response to a strike, the due process require-
ment must be modified to overcome this limitation.
An alternative to the current system could require a streamlined
hearing process. Consideration of written statements submitted by
the parties may accommodate both sides. Although the protection af-
forded the public employee is lessened under this procedure, protec-
tion still remains greater than in the private sector. In addition, the
employee is still offered the opportunity to present his case before a
neutral third party. Thus, the public employee would not be re-
quired to relinquish his "termination for cause only" status.
Prejudice under such procedures would be minimized if the
procedures were applied only to concerted activity situations. Conse-
quently, this situation would require extensive definitions determin-
ing the scope of concerted activities.
Although this suggested modification to the administrative pro-
cedures represents an erosion of some of the employees' rights, it
may be viewed as a reasonable trade-off for gaining the right to
strike. Where the employee gains the right to engage in concerted
activities, a traditionally private sector right, it is suggested that em-
ployment status should more closely correspond to the private sector
as well. Public sector employees would be offered a choice under this
method. They could either remain within the traditional public sec-
tor employment relationship and its due process guarantees, or exer-
cise rights commonly granted within the private sector and assume
the corresponding status. Under this model, public sector employees
still retain limited due process rights unlike private sector employees
who are terminable at will.
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3. Unique Features of the Public Sector
Features unique to the public sector have also been used as a
basis for questioning the applicability of traditional collective bar-
gaining principles. Its industry is primarily one of providing public
service. While a company within the private sector may lose profits
and deprive the market of its product, services offered by the public
sector are often essential and have widespread impact. These factors
clearly distinguish the public and private sectors.
One major purpose of an economic strike is to create economic
incentives for management to make concessions.157 This generally af-
fects the ability of the organization to function effectively, and the
availability of protective devices such as the lockout then becomes
critical.
In private industry, if the business does not function satisfacto-
rily, customers may choose to do business elsewhere. It has been ar-
gued that in the public sector, this choice is not generally available.
Statutorily governed services usually do not exist within a competi-
tive market.1"' There are few alternatives for "customers" within the
public sector in the event of a strike. Whereas one has a choice of
whether or not to buy a product or service within the private sector,
choice is often non-existent in the public sector. Children attend
public schools designated by residence. Police, fire protection and
public transportation allow for little personal choice. In the private
sector, one may choose among a variety of brands for the same prod-
uct. If a brand is unavailable there is usually an alternative. How-
ever, this analogy does not apply to most of the services and products
offered in the public sector. Legal limitations on concerted activity by
the public employee provide incentives for the public employee to
quickly resolve disputes with a focus on the affected public as well as
collective bargaining issues.
Clearly the scope of a public sector strike is broad. Diminishing
or curtailing services to the public will always be problematic. The
scope of the problem will be defined by the seriousness of deprivation
of services. These concerns were addressed in County Sanitation1 5 9
157. See Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employ-
ment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
158. See, e.g., statutes governing the employment of local state employees, CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 3500 et seq. (West 1980 & Supp. 1989); educational employees, Id. § 3540 et seq.
(West 1980 & Supp. 1989); and police, CAL. PENAL CODE § 830 et. seq. (West 1979 & Supp.
1989).
159. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees' Ass'n, 38 Cal.
3d 564, 577, 699 P.2d 835, 843-44, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 432-33 (1985).
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and were found to be of minimal consequence in today's labor mar-
ket. The availability of subcontractors decreases the prospect that es-
sential services will be interrupted. The recent air traffic controller's
strike'60 demonstrated the government's ability to hold firm against a
strike which caused substantial inconvenience and lasted a considera-
ble amount of time.
Additionally, political factors are more prevalent within the
public sector. Labor unions commonly endorse candidates and are
influential campaigners. Election or re-election considerations often
underlie concerns where labor problems exist. These concerns may
influence the desire for a quick outcome without focusing entirely on
the issues. 1 1 Traditional private sector responses become less effec-
tive when the employer's ultimate goal is a rapid settlement.
Consequently, strict adoption of the private sector model is
problematic. While recognizing that the private sector is a vastly
complex environment, it is afforded the "luxury" of having primarily
economic issues with which it must contend. The unique aspects of
the public sector must be reflected in any comprehensive scheme
dealing with this problem.
4. Models
Several states and countries have adopted statutes which recog-
nize a right to strike within the public sector. 6 These statutes tend
to be similar in many respects." The most common approach
utilizes several levels of negotiation prior to reaching the strike stage.
These levels include mandated negotiation' procedures, mediation,
and fact finding. 1 4 Often, external groups are appointed to regulate
the collective bargaining relationships. This method of managing the
process ensures statutory compliance and introduces an important
neutral mediating force.
a. The Alaskan Example
One example of this type of statutory scheme exists in the state
of Alaska. Alaska statute 23.40.200 divides public employees into
160. The strike resulted in the case of PATCO v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685
F.2d 547 (D.C Cir. 1982).
161. Id.
162 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1962); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (1988);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.18-179.19 (West 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003
(Purdon Supp. 1989); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit 21, § 1730 (1987).
163. See supra note 162.
164. See supra note 162.
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three groups; 1) public employees with no right to strike; 2) public
employees with a limited right to strike; and 3) public employees
with an unlimited right to strike."'
Employees with no right to strike include "police and fire pro-
tection employees, jail, prison and other correctional institution em-
ployees, and hospital employees."' 66 Employees in this class are au-
tomatically subject to injunctions, restraining orders, or "other
order[s] which may be appropriate" 6 " in the event of a strike. Col-
lective bargaining impasses or deadlocks are first submitted to media-
tion and then to binding arbitration.""
Public employees subject to the limited right to strike include
"public utility, snow removal, sanitation and public school and other
educational institution employees." '' This section requires such em-
ployees to first exhaust mediation procedures before undertaking for-
mal strike activities. Then, if a majority vote by secret ballot is in
favor of striking, the group may engage in a strike for a limited pe-
riod of time.170
The inclusion of public school employees in this section is some-
what misleading. Teachers and non-certified school district employ-
ees are not subject to the provisions of this statute and possess no
right to strike. In Anchorage Education Association v. Anchorage
School District"' the court held that teachers and non-certified em-
ployees are not public employees covered by A.S. 23.40.200.17' The
Anchorage Education Association argued that this construction "ren-
ders the term 'public school . . . employees' in section 200(c) mean-
ingless."1 7'  The Anchorage court responded by identifying other cer-
tified employees, such as principals and counselors, who would not
be excluded by this construction and who may possess a right to
strike.17 " Teachers were recognized as filling a special role in soci-
ety. 75 The court cited "functional limitations" as a reason for the
165. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(b), (c), (d) (1962).
166. Id. § 23.40.200(b).
167. Id.
168. Arbitrations are conducted in accordance with ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.030 (1962).
169. Id. § 23.40.200(c).
170. Id.
171. Anchorage Educ. Ass'n v. Anchorage School Dist., 648 P.2d 993 (1982).
172. "At first glance, section 200(c) includes teachers. But the definition section of
PERA [Public Employee Relations Act], A.S. 23.40.250(5), excludes 'teachers' from PERA
wherever 'public employee' appears. Thus, teachers, who are not 'public employees' for the
purposes of PERA, are not covered by A.S. 23.40.200." Id. at 995.
173. d.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 996.
[Vol. 29
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES
inability to extend a right to strike to this group.' 76 Without the
privilege and protection of a concerted strike, teachers in Alaska are
provided with only collective bargaining rights and binding arbitra-
tion in grievance procedures.' 77
b. The Swedish Example
Another similar system exists in Sweden. Sweden enacted a
statute which addressed strikes within the public education sector.' 7 8
This statute outlines a very structured approach to collective bar-
gaining which includes the option to strike. Several limitations apply
to this right to strike, including a limit on who may call the strike ' 79
a mandatory seven-days notice before striking, and the option to sub-
mit the dispute to mediation. In response to striking teachers, the
Swedish government may call a lockout. Once a lockout is called, the
union may not return to work until a contract settlement is
reached. 80
The type of system employed by Sweden has proven effective
for several reasons. First, striking is extremely costly to both sides.
Second, the structured approach ensures that all attempts to reach
agreement are exhausted. Third, the seven-days notice forces both
sides to live with, and reflect upon, their decision before it becomes
effective. The prospect of frivolous strikes is minimal under this
statute.
The Swedish system is similar to one aspect of the County Sani-
tation holding in that they do not permit public sector strikes where
a danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public is a
factor. This system also requires that the union give notice of the
intent to strike. Responses available to the government employer
range from injunctions to binding arbitration.
The experiences of other countries and states demonstrate that a
176. Id.
177. Id. at 997.
178. See Dichter, Pasadena Unified School District v. Pasadena Federation of Teach-
ers: A Limited Right to Strike for the Public School Teacher, 10 Sw. U.L. REV. 931, 946
(1978). See also Hight, Teachers, Bargaining and Strikes: Perspective from the Swedish Ex-
perience, 15 UCLA L. REV. 840 (1968).
179. See Dichter, supra note 178, at 947. "The power of the confederation is stronger
than that of the local, since only central organizations have the legal authority to call a strike."
Dichter supra note 178, at 947.
180. Dichter, supra note 178, at 947 n.93 "A lockout occurs when the government
closes down a school that has been struck, and employees, both striking and nonstriking, can-
not return to work until an agreement is concluded between the union and the struck school
employer." Dichter, supra note 178, at 947 n.93.
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limited right to strike can work within the public sector. The focus
on appropriate procedure protects both government and employee
interests.
VI. ANALYSIS
The County Sanitation decision presents a difficulty for public
sector employees, in that it provides the right to strike but remains
silent on allowable employer responses. The court has in effect pro-
vided a right to employees without addressing corresponding man-
agement concerns. Responses which have typically been applied to
legal economic strikes within the private sector, such as lockouts and
hiring permanent replacements, are in direct conflict with the prop-
erty interests which exist in most public sector positions. Ironically,
this creates an unequal bargaining position where laws enacted for
the protection of the weaker group, the employees, instill a level of
power not previously contemplated by giving employees the power to
disrupt government and societal affairs.
Justice Lucas' dissent in County Sanitation rightfully acknowl-
edges the difficulty the courts face in trying to govern an employment
relationship which requires a "comprehensive regulatory scheme."181
Justice Lucas' dissent also stresses the devastation that public sector
strikes may wreak on a city. Until recently, public sector strikes have
always been illegal. Nevertheless, they have consistently occurred. By
preserving the illegal status of public sector strikes, the state has not
prevented their occurrence but, instead, has been prevented from de-
veloping an effective system for dealing with strikes.
Legislation legalizing public sector strikes could provide a lim-
ited right to strike and set forth the "comprehensive regulatory
scheme" which is missing. Under the current legislative scheme, the
blanket prohibition against public sector strikes is not viewed seri-
ously. Employees ignoring such prohibitions have, for years, gone on
strike. The legalization of public sector strikes in several other
states182 has fueled the belief that these blanket prohibitions are out-
dated. In addition, they provide tested systems from which California
could develop its own approach.
Such legislation could categorize the various types of public sec-
181. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees' Ass'n, 38 Cal.
3d 564, 611, 699 P.2d 835, 867-68, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 456-66 (Lucas J., dissenting).
182. See supra note 162. See also Summary of Public Sector Labor Relations Policies,
Attorney General Opinions and Selected Court Decisions, US Department of Labor - Labor
Management Services Administration (1981).
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tor employees by job type. Thus, strikes involving critical health and
safety concerns would not unexpectedly arise and could be prevented.
Corpton and County Sanitation demonstrate that a case by case ba-
sis is not the most effective manner of resolving these disputes. This
task remains unmanageable so long as the present structure remains.
In order to fully consider the issue of employer responses to
strikes, two major issues must be addressed. They are: (1) the type of
employee and (2) the type of strike. The County Sanitation decision,
as well as several state laws, fairly articulate a distinction between
"essential" and "non-essential" functions. The differences between
these functions are critical and thus compel a different standard of
employer response. In addition, the legality or illegality of the strike
will also determine the appropriate employer response.
A. Type of Employee
The service orientation of public sector employment provides a
basis by which public employees can be categorized. Public sectorjobs cover the spectrum between essential and non-essential func-
tions. Any statutory scheme addressing public sector concerted activ-
ity must minimize the interruption of essential services. However,
there is no reason for treating non-essential functions in the same
manner. Striking electricians or clerk-typists generally do not pose
the same level of threat as striking police or firefighters.
B. Type of Strike
This Comment suggests that legalizing public sector strikes
could provide a basis for developing a comprehensive scheme for
dealing with such strikes. However, this in no way suggests that all
public sector strikes should be legal. Concerted activity falling
outside the parameter of any legislative scheme would remain illegal.
Current responses to illegal public sector strikes should remain
intact.
VII. PROPOSAL
One of the clearest concepts to emerge from County Sanitation
and Compton is the proposition that the public sector is in need of
guidance in the area of employment relations. One alternative cur-
rently being pursued within the legislature proposes to amend the
California Constitution to prohibit strikes by public employees. 188
183. A.C.A. 7, 1987-88 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1987 California Laws.
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Another alternative, which recognizes the right to strike, allows
for traditional private sector responses such as lockouts and hiring
permanent replacements. Under the present statutory scheme, lock-
outs and hiring permanent replacements cannot be utilized. The ma-
jor obstacle lies in the property rights possessed by public employees.
As the statutes presently read, public employees may not be summa-
rily dismissed for strike activities."" Consequently, dismissal of pub-
lic employees for strike activities would require individual due pro-
cess and dismissal hearings. This administrative burden could not
reasonably be met by the public school employer. It is, therefore,
necessary that more effective responses be available to the employer
if public strikes are to be legalized.
The Legislature could address this problem by amending the
statutes which grant property rights. This amendment could provide
that while public employees are engaged in concerted activities, they
waive the property interests in their jobs. Modification of the present
due process requirements would provide a more effective system
while still preserving the public employee's right to due process., The
employer would then have available the options of lockouts and hir-
ing permanent replacements without the crippling effect of imple-
menting the current due process procedures. This type of amend-
ment would both reconcile the statutory block against implemen-
tation of strike responses and defeat the imbalance created by the due
process requirements.
The approach to this solution must be twofold. First, specific
statutory amendments to the current scheme must be implemented
before any new structure could be adopted. These amendments
would provide that any new statutes would not be in conflict with
the current state of the law.
Second, a modified approach based on one of the proven sys-
tems, such as the Alaskan or Swedish model, could be adopted. Cate-
gorizing employee groups, distinguishing between legal and illegal
strikes, and providing mechanisms for dispute resolution must all be
included in a workable system. Legislation addressing public sector
strikes must then include definitions describing the various types of
employees. In addition, standards should be established to address
the differing levels of job security which must be afforded to these
employees, and include distinctions for legal and illegal strikes. By
enacting legislation addressing these issues, the State of California
could define a limited right to strike, provide definitional guidelines
184. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 87732 (West 1989).
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and more effectively address the issue of employer responses to pub-
lic strikes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The longstanding illegal status of public sector strikes has done
little to prevent their occurrence. Recognition by the Legislature of a
right to strike would provide the means to develop a comprehensive
scheme for dealing with public sector strikes. The employee would
be provided with a realistic standard by which concerted activities
could be governed. The employer would be provided with an effec-
tive tool for responding to such activities.
This Comment has addressed various aspects of the right to
strike within California's public employment sector. It examined the
scope of County Sanitation and discussed its applicability to employ-
ees covered by the Education Employee Relations Act. The Public
Employment Relations Board's Compton decision which attempted
to distinguish County Sanitation lacked consensus on both the analy-
sis and final decision. Consequently, no clear holding exists on
whether there is a right to strike under EERA. However, the simi-
larities between EERA and MMBA present a strong argument in
favor of the existence of a right to strike for public school employees.
Realistic and effective employer strike responses must be devel-
oped for use in the public sector. Proven models exist within other
jurisdictions and provide models from which California could derive
its own system. The limited right to strike and traditional private
sector remedies could be applied after laying the proper foundation.
Statutory and common law obstacles can be removed through legisla-
tive amendments to existing laws.
It appears the right to strike will not only remain prevalent in
our society but is likely to expand. Likewise, the incentive to explore
potential responses remains equally strong.
Donna Williamson
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